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By Dominique Frischer

"l'image de l. a. France analysée et jugée par des étrangers".
À mesure que 1993 se rapproche, il semblerait que les Français, d'abord confiants en leurs ressources, voire convaincus de leur strength, se préoccupent soudain de l'image qu'ils donnent à l'étranger.
Ils ont raison. Archaïsme, hiérarchisation poussée à l'extrême, mégalomanie, frilosité, système de formation inadapté au monde moderne, élites sans véritables compétences, « mauvais buyers » : les avis recueillis par l'auteur auprès d'experts de haut niveau et de toutes nationalités – Allemands, Italiens, Anglais, Hollandais, Japonnais, Américains – concordent. Ces regards jouent un rôle de révélateur et devraient provoquer un véritable électrochoc, peut-être douloureux mais salutaire.
Sait-on combien d'entreprises françaises sont bradées aux Allemands ? De quelle façon – c'est une info inédite – les Français ont été floués par les Américains lors de l'implantation de Disneyland à Marne-la-Vallée ? À quel aspect nos diplômés sont sous-estimés à l’étranger et nos buyers jugés peu qualifiés ? Et surtout, ces étrangers nous montrent que le mythe de l. a. France paresseuse a vécu, mais que ce qui nous fait défaut, c'est un rêve mobilisateur.
Que le tableau de nos insuffisances soit gowné avec un mélange de sévérité mais aussi d'humour et de bienveillance, par des professionnels qui considèrent que vivre en France est un plaisir et un privilège, ne fait que renforcer le trait.
La France se trompe d'image et se cramponne à une représentation erronée de son statut et de son rôle dans le monde. Ce livre invite à briser ce miroir déformant.

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For he can recall what the experience was like. That requires knowing what character it had at the time, since one cannot remember something one did not originally know. Memory preserves but does not create knowledge. 6 For discussion of this issue, see essays 20–24 in Block et al. (1997). 7 See Nagel (1979b, 1994, 1998), and McGinn (1989, 1991, 1999). McGinn and Nagel think there must be a way of understanding how the operations of our brains give rise to consciousness, but that we currently have no conception of how that could be.

Eccles (1985) contains contributions mostly by scientists, both philosophical and scientific in character. Block et al. (1997) is devoted specifically to recent work on consciousness. “By the term ‘thought’,” Descartes says, “I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it” (1984, vol. 9]). This corresponds to the feature of consciousness I describe below as non-inferential knowledge of our modes of consciousness. Descartes held also that a state is a mental state only if it is conscious, but this is widely regarded as too stringent a requirement, for reasons considered below.

Thus, the state type and output type cannot feature appropriately in a contingent causal law. 70 If this reasoning is correct, analytic functionalism entails epiphenomenalism with respect to these outputs. An advantage of functionalism over behaviorism was supposed to be that it makes mental states causes of behavior. The trouble is that it does so in a way that undercuts the possibility of those states being causally relevant to what we expect them to be. Worse, it seems quite plausible that we do conceive of our mental states as causally relevant to the behavior that we would use to define mental states on a functional analysis.

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